Predicting 'it will work for us': (way) beyond statistics. by Cartwright,  N.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
13 April 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Cartwright, N. (2011) 'Predicting 'it will work for us': (way) beyond statistics.', in Causality in the sciences.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.001.0001
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a draft of a chapter that was accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the book 'Causality in the
sciences.' edited by Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson and published in 2011.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
Predicting ‘It Will Work for Us’: (Way) Beyond Statistics 
Nancy Cartwright 
LSE and UCSD 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The topic of this paper is ‘external validity’ and its problems. The discussion will be 
confined to a special class of conclusions:  causal conclusions drawn from statistical 
studies whose fundamental logic depends on JS Mill’s method of difference. These 
include randomized control trials (RCTs), case control studies and cohort studies.   
 
These kinds of studies aim to establish conclusions of the form ‘Treatment T causes 
outcome O’ by finding a difference in the probability (or mean value) of O between 
two groups, commonly called the ‘treatment’ and the ‘control’ groups.1 Given the 
method-of-difference idea, in order for the causal conclusion to be justified the two 
groups must have the same distribution of causal factors for O except T itself and its 
downstream effects. The underlying supposition is that differences in probabilities 
require a causal explanation; if the distribution of causes in the two groups is the 
same but for T yet the probability of O differs between them, the only possible 
explanation is that T causes O. The studies differ by how they go about trying to 
ensure as best possible that the two study groups do have the same distribution for 
causal factors other than T. There are, as we know, heated debates about the 
importance of randomization in this regard but these debates are tangential to my 
topic.  
 
I want to separate issues in order to focus on a question of use. Suppose, contrary to 
realistic fact, that we could be completely satisfied that the two groups had identical 
distributions for the other factors causally relevant to O. I shall call this an ideal Mill’s 
method-of-difference study. What is the form of the conclusion that can be drawn 
from that and of what use is it? In particular of what use is it in predicting whether T 
will cause O, or produce an improvement in the probability or mean of O, ‘for us’ – in 
a population we are concerned with, implemented as it may be implemented there?  
 
The basic problem is that the kinds of conclusions that are properly warranted by the 
method-of-difference design are conclusions confined to the population in the study. 
That is seldom, indeed almost never, the population that we want to know about.2  A 
difference in the probability of the outcome in this kind of study can at best establish 
what I call ‘it-works-somewhere’ claims and the somewhere is never where we aim to 
make further predictions. We want to know, ‘Will it work for us in our target population 
as it would be implemented there?’ This questions often goes under the label of an 
‘effectiveness’ claim. I call it more perspicuously an ‘it-will-work-for-us’ claim. The 
problem of how to move from an it-works-somewhere claim to an it-will-work-for-us 
claim usually goes under the label ‘external validity’ and is loosely expressed as the 
question ‘Under what conditions can the conclusion established in a study be applied 
to other populations?’  
 
In this paper I shall argue for two claims: a negative claim that external validity is the 
wrong idea and a positive claim that what I call ‘capacities’ and Mill called 
                                                 
1
 Naturally only a difference in frequency is observed. There is thus a preliminary question of statistical 
inference: what probabilities to infer from the observed frequencies. I set this question aside here 
because I want to focus on the issue of causal inference. 
2
 Even if the entire target population were enrolled in the study, predictions will be about future 
effectiveness where there may be no guarantee that this population stays the same over time with 
respect to the causally relevant factors. 
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‘tendencies’ are almost always the only right idea. The currently popular solution to 
the problem of external validity from philosophers and statisticians alike is to study 
the ‘invariance’ characteristics of the probability distribution that describes the 
population in the study. I shall argue that external validity is the wrong way to express 
the problem and invariance is a poor strategy for fixing it. Probabilistic results are 
invariant under only the narrowest conditions, almost never met. What’s useful is to 
establish not the invariance of the probabilistic result but the invariance of the 
contribution the cause produces, where the concept of ‘contribution’ only applies 
where a ‘tendency claim’ is valid. Tendencies, I shall argue, are the primary conduit 
by which ‘it-works-somewhere’ claims can support that it will work for us.  
 
This raises a serious problem that I want to stress: Reasoning involving 
capacities/tendencies requires a lot more evidence and evidence of far different kinds 
than we are generally instructed to consider and we lack good systematic accounts 
of what this evidence can or should look like.3  
 
In particular I shall argue: 
 
 1. We need lots more than statistics to establish tendency claims. 
  
2. The very way tendencies operate means that building a good model to predict 
effectiveness is a delicate, creative enterprise requiring a large variety of information, 
at different levels of generality, from different fields and of different types. 
 
3. Correlatively we need a large amount of varied evidence to back up the 
information that informs the model.  
 
2. What can Mill’s method of difference establish, even in the ideal? 
 
I should begin with a couple of caveats. My discussion takes ‘ideal’ seriously. What 
can be done in the real world is far from the ideal and I will not discuss how to handle 
that obvious fact. I want to stress problems that we have even where some 
reasonable adjustment for departures from the ideal is possible. The second caveat 
is that I discuss only inferences of a narrow kind, from ‘T causes O somewhere’ to ‘T, 
as T will be implemented by us, will cause O for us’. For most practical policy 
purposes, inferences that start from ‘T cause O somewhere’  need to end up with 
conclusions of a different form from this, often at best at ‘T’ will cause O’ for us’ 
where T’ and O’ bear some usually not very well understood relation to T and O. I 
suppose here that the inferences made assume at least that T and O are fixed from 
premise to conclusion, though other causal factors may be changed as a result of our 
methods of implementation.4 With these caveats in place, turn now to the meat of 
what I want to discuss.  
 
If the conclusion that we look for in answer to the question in the title of this section is 
to be a causal claim (as opposed to a merely probabilistic claim) about T and O, then 
here is at least one valid conclusion that can be drawn using Mill’s methods, 
                                                 
3
 Consider as a smattering of  examples the evidence use guideliness from the U.S. Dept of Education 
(2003),  the Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline Network (2008), Sackett et al. (2000), Atkins et al. 
(2004) or the Cabinet Office (2000). 
4
 Exactly what counts as changing T versus changing additional factors that were in place in the study 
but are not in place in the target implementation is a little arbitrary. But drawing a rough distinction 
helps make clear what additional problems still face us even if T and O are entirely fixed.  (Thanks to 
John Worrall for urging me to make these two caveats explicit. For more on both issues, I suggest 
looking at Worrall’s many papers on these subjects. Cf. Worrall (2007) and references therein.) 
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supposing them applied ideally (which of course we can only hope to do 
approximately and even then, we seldom are in a strong position to know whether we 
have succeeded): 
 
The treatment, T, administered as it is in the study, causes the outcome, O, in 
some individuals in the study population, X. 
 
This conclusion depends on the assumption that if there are more cases of O in the 
subpopulation of X where T obtains (the ‘treatment group’) than in the subpopulation 
in which it does not (the ‘control group’), then at least some individuals in the 
treatment group have been caused to be O by T.  
 
Since this conclusion depends on taking causal notions seriously and in particular on 
taking the notion of singular causation5 as already given, those who are suspicious 
about causation tend instead to look for mere probabilistic conclusions. The usual 
one to cite is mean effect size: the mean of O in the treatment group minus the mean 
of O in the control group (<O>T −<O>C). 
 
What about the external validity of this conclusion?  
 
ESEV (effect size external validity): When will the mean difference be the 
same between the study population X and a target population θ?  
 ESEV Answer 1: If T makes the same difference in O for every member of 
X and θ.  
 
This however is a situation that we can expect to be very rare. Usually the effect of a 
cause will be relational, depending in particular on characteristics of the systems 
affected. Consider an uncontroversial case, well-known and well-understood. The 
effect of gravity or of electromagnetic attraction and repulsion on the force an object 
is subject to depends, for gravity, on the mass of that object, and for 
electromagnetism, on the magnetic or electric charge of the affected object.  
 
A more widely applicable answer than ESEV Answer 1 is available wherever the 
probabilistic theory of causation holds. This theory supposes that the probability (in 
the sense of objective chance) of an effect O is the same for any population that has 
all the same causes of O and for which the causes of O all take the same value; i.e. 
the probability is the same for all members of a causally homogeneous subclass.6 
Loosely, ‘The probability of an effect is set once the values of all its causes are fixed’. 
The set of causes of O that are supposed fixed in this assumption are those 
characteristics that appear in the antecedent of a complete and correct causal law for 
O.7   The probabilistic theory of causation then provides a second sufficient condition 
for effect size external validity.  
 
 ESEV Answer 2: When X and θ are the same with respect to 
                                                 
5
 That is, that ‘T causes O in individual i’ is already understood. Alternatively, one could presuppose 
the probabilistic theory of causality in which T causes O in a population φ that is causally 
homogeneous but for T and it’s downstream effects just in case in φ,  Prob(O/T) > Prob(O/-T). Then if 
Prob(O) in the experimental population with T > Prob(O) in the experimental population with –T, we 
can be assured that there is a subpopulation of X in which ‘T causes O’. (But note that if the two 
probabilities are equal, we have no reason to judge that T causes O in no subpopulations rather than 
that its positive effects in some cancel its negative effect in others.) 
6
 These probabilities will be zero or one where determinism holds but not in cases where causality can 
be purely probabilistic.  
7
 What counts as ‘complete’ and correct here requires some care in defining; delving into this issue 
takes us too far from the main topic of this paper. 
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a) The causal laws affecting O AND 
b) Each ‘causally homogeneous’ subclass has the same probability in 
θ as in X. 
 
Sufficiency follows from the probabilistic theory of causation. In addition, these two 
are also almost necessary. When they do not hold then ESEV is an accident of the 
numbers. This can be seen by constructing cases with different causal laws (hence 
different subclasses that are causally homogenous) or with different probabilities for 
the causally homogeneous  subclasses (e.g., shifting weights between those 
subclasses in which T is causally positive for O and those for  which it is causally 
negative or less strongly positive).8  
 
These are strong conditions, and they are recognized as such by many scholars who 
try to be careful about external validity. One good example appears in a debate about 
the legitimacy of reanalyzing the results from RCTs on the effects on families from 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods of moving to socioeconomically better 
neighbourhoods. In ‘What Can We Learn about Neighborhood Effects from the 
Moving to Opportunity Experiment?’9 Ludwig et al take the purist position: They 
oppose taking away lessons that the study was not designed to teach. In a section 
titled ‘Internal versus External Validity’, these authors further caution --  
 
…MTO defined its eligible sample as…[see below]. Thus MTO data…are strictly 
informative only about this population subset – people residing in high-rise public 
housing in the mid-1990’s, who were at least somewhat interested in moving and 
sufficiently organized to take note of the opportunity  and complete an 
application. The MTO results should only be extrapolated to other populations if 
the other families, their residential environments, and their motivations for moving 
are similar to those of the MTO population. 
 
The trouble here is that RCTs are urged in the first place because we do not know 
what the other causes of the outcome are, let alone knowing that they have the same 
distribution in the study population as in possible target populations. This is a fact the 
authors themselves make much of in insisting that only conclusions based on the full 
RCT design can be drawn. For instance, they explain – 
 
 The key problem facing nonexperimental approaches is classic omitted-
variable bias. 
 
and 
 
A second problem … is our lack of knowledge of which neighborhood 
characteristics matter…Suppose it is the poverty rate in a person’s apartment 
building, and not in the rest of the census tract…[BUT an experimental] 
mobility intervention changes an entire bundle of neighborhood 
characteristics, and the total impact of changing this entire bundle…can be 
estimated even if the researcher does not know which neighborhood 
variables matter. 
 
The overall lesson I want to urge from this is that effect size will seldom travel from 
the study population to target populations and even when it does, we seldom have 
enough background knowledge to be justified in assuming so.  
                                                 
8
 The constructions resemble those illustrating Simpson’s paradox. Cf. Cartwright (1979); Salmon 
(1971). 
9
 Ludwig et al. (2008) 
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Effect size is a very precise result however. Perhaps we would be happy with 
something weaker, for instance, the direction of the effect. So we should ask:   
 
Effect direction external validity (EDEV): When will an increase (resp. decrease 
or no difference) in the probability or mean of O given T in a study population X 
be sufficient for an increase (resp. decrease or no difference) in a target 
population θ?  
 
There are a variety of answers that can supply sufficient conditions, including – 
 
 EDEV Answer 1:  If X and θ  
a) Have the same causal laws AND 
b) Unanimity: T acts in the same direction with respect to O in all 
causally homogeneous subpopulations. 
 
 EDEV Answer 2: If θ has ‘the right’ subpopulations in the ‘right’ 
proportions. 
 
Both these answers are still very demanding. Clearly they require a great deal of 
background knowledge before we are warranted in assuming that they hold. In the 
end I shall argue that there is no substitute for knowing a lot, though there will be 
different kinds of things we need to know to follow the alternative route I propose – 
that of exporting facts about the contributions of stable tendencies. The tendency 
route is often no more epistemically demanding10 than what these answers require 
for exporting effect direction or effect size and tendencies are a far more powerful 
tool more widely applicable: Tendencies can hold and be of use across a wide range 
of circumstances where ESEV Answer 1 fails; they also underwrite condition EDEV 
1b. when it holds yet can be of use even where it fails; and they do not depend, as 
EDEV 2. and ESEV 2. do, on getting the weights of various subpopulations right in 
order to be a reliable tool for predicting direction of changes in the outcome.  
 
Let us turn then to this alternative route, which involves exporting not probabilistic 
facts but causal facts. Doing so requires that we be careful in how we formulate 
causal claims. In particular it is important for this purpose to distinguish three different 
kinds of causal claim. 
 
 
2. Three kinds of causal claim 
 
The distinctions that matter for our discussion are those among -- 
 
1. It-works-somewhere claims: T causes O somewhere under some conditions 
(e.g. in study population X administered by method M). 
2. Tendency claims: T has a (relatively) stable tendency to promote O. 
3. It-will-work-for-us claims: T would cause O in ‘our’ population θ administered 
as it would be administered.  
 
 
3.1 T causes O somewhere 
 
                                                 
10
 Nor, sadly, do I think we can hope for answers that are less demanding epistemically if we want 
sound and valid arguments. And that’s the point: we need to know what the premises are for a valid 
argument; only then can we get on with the serious job of seeing to what degree they can be warranted.  
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This is just the kind of claim that method-of-difference studies can provide evidence 
for; and it is important information to have. In saying this I follow, for instance, Curtis 
Meinert11 when he says:  ‘There is no point in worrying whether a treatment works 
the same or differently in men and women until it has been shown to work in 
someone.’12 
 
It-works-somewhere claims are the kind of claim that medical and social sciences 
work hard to establish with a reasonably high degree of certainty. But what makes 
these claims evidence for effectiveness claims: T will cause O for us? I have 
reviewed the standard answer: external validity. My alternative is tendency claims: T 
has a (relatively) stable tendency to promote O.  
 
 
3.2 T has a stable tendency to promote O 
   
 
3.2.1 What are tendencies? 
 
I have written a lot about the metaphysics, epistemology and methodology of 
tendencies already.13 Here I hope to convey a sense of what they are and what they 
can do with a couple of canonical examples. For instance, 
 
 Masses have a stable tendency to attract other masses. 
 Aspirins have a relatively stable tendency to relieve headaches. 
 
The driving concept in the logic of tendencies is that of a stable contribution. A 
feature, like having a mass, has a stable tendency when there is a fixed contribution 
that it can be relied on to make whenever14 it is present (or properly triggered), where 
contributions do not always (indeed in many areas seldom) result in the naturally 
associated behaviours. The contribution from one cause can be – and often is – 
offset by contributions from features as well as unsystematic interferences. The mass 
of the earth is always pulling the pin towards it even if the pin lifts into the air because 
the magnet contributes a pull upwards. What actually happens on a given occasion 
will be some kind of resultant of all the contributions combining together plus any 
unsystematic interferences that may occur. 
 
Reasoning in terms of contributions is common throughout the natural and social 
sciences and in daily life. Consider the California class-size reduction failure.15 Here 
is a stripped down version of the widely accepted account of what went wrong. 
 
There were well conducted RCTs in Tennessee showing that small class sizes 
improved reading scores there (that is, providing evidence for an it-works-somewhere 
claim). But when California cut its class sizes almost in half, little improvement in 
scores resulted. That is not because there was a kind of holisitc effect in Tennessee 
                                                 
11
 Meinert is a prominent expert on clinical trial methodology and outspoken opponent of the US NIH 
diversity act demanding studies of subgroups because they generally cannot be based on proper RCT 
design. I agree with him that about the importance of knowing it works somewhere. But my point in 
this paper is that that knowledge is a tiny part of the body of evidence necessary to make reasonable 
predictions about what will work for us. 
12
 Quoted from Epstein (2007). 
13
 Cf. Cartwright (1989) and (2007a). 
14
 Though note that some tenancies can be purely probabilistic and also the range of application can be 
limited. 
15
 Bohrnstedt et al. (2002) 
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where the result depended on the special interaction among all the local factors 
there. Rather, so the story goes, the positive contribution of small class size was 
offset by the negative contributions of reduced teacher quality and inadequate 
classroom and backup support. These latter resulted because the programme was 
rolled out statewide over the course of a year. This created a demand for twice as 
many teachers and twice as many classrooms that couldn’t be met without a 
dramatic reduction in quality. The positive contribution of small class size was not 
impugned by these results but possibly even borne out: The presumption seems to 
be that scores would have been even worse had the poorer quality teaching and 
accommodation been introduced without reducing class sizes as well. The reasoning 
is just like that with a magnet and gravity acting together on a pin. 
 
 
Tendency claims are thus a natural conduit by which it-works-somewhere claims 
come to count as evidence for it-will-work-for-us claims. It should be noted however 
that a stable tendency to contribute a given result is not in any way universally 
indicated by the fact that a feature like class size participates in causing that result 
somewhere. Nevertheless, if a result is to be exported from a study to help predict 
what happens in a new situation, it can seldom be done by any other route.  
 
 
3.2.2 The big problem for tendency logic 
 
The central problem for reasoning involving tendencies is that we do not have good 
systematic accounts of what it takes to establish such claims. We have nice histories 
of establishing particular claims, especially in physics, but little explicit methodology. 
This contrasts, for instance, with it-work-somewhere claims. We have a variety of 
well-known well-studied methods for establishing these, methods for which we have 
strong principled accounts of how they are supposed to work to provide warrant for 
their conclusions and of where we must be cautious about their application. Recently, 
for instance, there has been a great deal of attention and debate devoted to Mill’s-
method-of-difference studies and to the advantages and disadvantages of various 
methods for ensuring that the requisite conditions are met that allow them to deliver 
valid conclusions. But if I am right that tendencies are the chief conduit by which it-
works-somewhere claims come to support it-will-work-for-us, this attention focuses 
on only a very small part of the problem. For an it-works-somewhere claim is at best 
a single rock in the kind of foundation needed to support a tendency claim.  
 
So I want to plead for more systematic work to lay out the kinds of studies and types 
of evidence that best support tendency claims. As best I can tell ultimately we need a 
theory to establish tendency claims, though admittedly often we will have to settle for 
our best stab at the important relevant features of such a theory. That’s because 
contributions come in bundles and are characterized relative to each other. We only 
have good evidence that gravity is still working when the pin soars into the air 
because we can ‘subtract away’ the contribution of the magnet and thus calculate 
that gravity is still exerting its pull. To do that we need to have an idea both about 
what other factors make what other contributions and what the appropriate rule of 
composition for them is.16  
 
Of course we most often have to proceed to make it-will-work-for-us predictions 
without a well-developed theory. In that case we make our bets. My point is that we 
must be clear what we are betting on and what evidence is available to back up the 
                                                 
16
 Note though the tension here: Most advocates of RCTs like them because, they claim, no substantive 
theory is required to do what they purport to do – i.e. establish an ‘it-works-somewhere’ claim. 
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bet, even what kind of further evidence we should be setting out to learn. Are we 
betting on, and using the logic of, stable tendencies, and if so, to what extent does 
our evidence back us up in this? Or are we betting on facts about identical causal 
laws and correct distributions of other causal factors between study and target 
populations, and if so, to what extent does our evidence support that?  
 
 
3.2.3 Tendencies versus external validity  
 
My overall message is that sometimes there are tendencies to be learned about. 
Where there is a stable tendency, this provides a strong predictive tool for a very 
great range of different kinds of target populations. It naturally does not tell us what 
the observed result will be unless we know there are no unsystematic interferences 
at work, we have good knowledge of the contributions that will be made by the other 
causal factors present and we can estimate how these contributions combine, which 
is very seldom the case outside the controlled environment of a physics laboratory. 
But when we know a tendency claim we can make a prediction about the direction of 
change. Whatever the result would have been, if the cause is added the new result 
will differ by just the amount predictable from the contribution. But beware. The 
comparison we can make is with what the result would have been post 
implementation, just subtracting the effect of T itself. So, even restricting ourselves 
just to claims about direction of change, we still have not arrived at an ‘it will work for 
us’ claim, as I have characterized that. 
 
Let us return to a comparison of tendencies versus external validity – predicting that 
‘the same’ effect, either effect size or effect direction, will hold in the target as in the 
study population.   
 
 Neither can be taken for granted. 
 Both require a great deal of evidence to warrant them, though of different kinds.   
 With respect to effect direction:  
 Stable tendencies: Post-implementation effect direction can be predicted 
from knowledge that T has a stable tendency to promote O (that it makes, 
say, a known contribution) without requiring knowledge of the distribution of 
other causal factors in the target.  
 External validity: 
• Recall by contrast that under EDEV 2. the distribution of causally 
homogeneous subpopulations must be ‘right’ in order for the effect 
direction to be the same in the target as in the study population; and of 
course for cases in which some set of right conditions hold, it takes 
considerable background knowledge of what the other causal factors are 
and what the target situation is like to be warranted in assuming they do. 
• T has a stable tendency to promote O implies EDEV 1.b).   
• What about EDEV 1.a)? I have not gone into the issue of the range 
across which a cause must make the same contribution in order to be 
labelled as a tendency. Obviously there is no firm answer. What matters is 
that there should be good reasons to back up whatever range is 
presupposed in a given application. Many well-known tendencies, 
however, can survive a change in the other causes that affect the same 
outcome. Philosophers keen on modularity as a mark of genuine 
causation often insist that this is a widespread feature and it is often 
supposed in science as well. For instance most of us are familiar from 
elementary economics with exercises to calculate what happens if the 
demand laws change while the contribution to exchange from the supply 
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side  stays fixed, and vice versa. When that’s the case tendency 
reasoning can provide predictions of effect direction that EDEV 1 cannot, 
though of course the assumptions that a tendency is stable across 
changes in other causal laws needs good arguments to back it up. 
 With respect to effect size: 
 Stable tendencies. Effect size can be calculated when the contributions of all 
major tendencies present in a situation are known, or reasonably 
approximated, along with the appropriate rule of combination. This is typically 
what we demand from an engineering design but can surely never be 
supposed for social and economic policies for effects on crime, education or 
public health. Various narrow medical cases are generally thought of as lying 
in between these extremes.  
 External validity. It is seldom the case that the target and study populations 
have the same causal laws and same distribution of causal factors, and even 
more rare that we should be warranted in supposing so. So if the external 
validity of effect size is our primary method for learning something about 
target populations from Mill’s method-of-difference studies, these studies will 
be of very little use to us. 
 Use of the logic of tendencies is epistemically demanding. But so is external 
validity, only in different ways. Tendency knowledge, where available, can do 
more than traditional external validity reasoning and is far more widely applicable. 
Moreover tendency logic is well established to work well in a variety of domains. 
So it is wasteful and capricious to refuse to use this logic when evidence is 
available for it. Of course often some evidence will be available but not enough to 
clinch our conclusions. That is the human condition and it applies in spades to 
external validity reasoning as well. When clinching evidence is missing, we had 
best proceed with caution and, if we can, hedge our bets. 
 
 
3.3 T will work for us 
 
 
3.3.1 Counterfactuals: case-specific versus general-purpose causal models  
 
Julian Reiss and I17 each argue that it-will-work-for-us claims are best supported by 
case-specific causal models. It is not unusual among causal theorists nowadays to 
urge that these kinds of claims are best evaluated via causal models. After all, these 
are singular counterfactual claims: T would cause O if it were implemented in our 
population as it would be implemented there. The central difference between our 
claims and many others is the emphasis on ‘case-specific’ – i.e. on models built 
specifically for the counterfactual at hand, as it will be implemented. 
 
For contrast consider the models of Judea Pearl, who has developed what must be 
the most detailed and thorough semantics for causal counterfactuals now available.18 
In Pearl’s semantics counterfactuals are, as I advocate, evaluated on the basis of a 
causal model.  I think I can explain the kinds of difficulties that face the use of 
general-purpose as opposed to case-specific models by reference to Pearl’s models, 
without laying out details of his approach. 
 
Causal models for Pearl are of a very specific form. The form connects neatly with 
our general probabilistic methods for discovering ‘it-works-somewhere’ claims; and 
this is both their strength and their weakness. For the somewhere is never here. 
                                                 
17
 Reiss (2007); Cartwright (2007b) 
18
 Pearl (2000) 
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Even if – contrary to what can ever realistically happen – a study encompasses the 
entire target population, the population of the study is not literally the same as the 
one about which future predictions are made. One may suppose that the same 
causal model will describe the ‘same’ population in the future as in the past but that is 
a strong assumption of external validity and it should have evidence, reason and 
argument to back it up.19  
 
Reiss and I both stress that a causal model for evaluating ‘it-will-work-for-us’ claims 
needs to be built to the case at hand – for the given cause as, where and when it will 
implemented. A causal model for the system as it has been functioning or for similar 
systems is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not sufficient because 
implementations of a cause often bring about importantly relevant changes, not only 
in the arrangement of other causes but also in the basic governing causal principles. 
It is not necessary because, as with external validity, the same as before or as 
elsewhere is the wrong idea. How the system has behaved so far or how ‘similar’ 
systems behave can be a clue to what will happen when the cause is implemented, 
but only a clue. We often have reason to suppose that it is the central clue; often we 
have reason to think it is not because we know how easily the system of laws or the 
arrangement of causes at work in our case might be.  ‘The same’ causal model is just 
as much a hypothesis about a future case as is any new causal model proffered in its 
stead. 
 
In the ideal a case-specific causal model to evaluate a specific it-will-work-for-us 
counterfactual will contain two essential ingredients:  
 a list of ‘all’ the causes (or all the ones that can have a significant effect on the 
outcome) that will be present once the targeted cause is implemented 
 a tool for calculating what happens with respect to the targeted effect when these 
all act together. 
With this information we can predict the effect.  
 
 
The trouble with causal models of this form is that we are seldom in a position to 
produce them with anything like a high degree of reliability. It is thus a good thing that 
for many kinds of predictions they are not necessary. Sometimes there are ‘shortcut’ 
models, or what following Gerd Gigerenzer20 we might call ‘cheap heuristics’, that 
predict approximately enough the same result, sometimes even provably so, without 
mirroring the causal narrative that will unfold in nature as an ideal case-specific 
causal model does. Alternatively, sometimes there are good partial models that 
predict aspects of the effect, for example, estimates of effect size difference. 
Moreover when we are lucky an already constructed model laying out the causal 
laws that have governed the system till now or that govern similar systems can be 
taken over wholesale to serve for the specific case. But to repeat, the case-specific 
model that we get by this strategy is as much in need of justification as any other. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 It should be noted that this is not just a reappearance of Hume’s problem of induction. For the 
problem itself presupposes that there are general principles of some kinds at work in nature and even 
that we can find out about them, understand how they work and predict what kinds of conditions are 
required for a system to continue to operate as before. This is how we can often be confident that our 
interventions will not be successful because they will shift the arrangements of causes at work or 
undermine the operating principles. A better label for the problems for invariance I raise here is ‘Mill’s 
problem of induction’ since it is the kind of worry that he described in arguing that economics cannot 
be an inductive science. (Mill (1836); for further discussion see Cartwright (forthcoming.) 
20
 Gigenerzer et al. (1999) 
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3.3.2 Tendencies and causal models for it-will-work-for-us claims 
 
Tendency claims play an important role in constructing causal models for evaluating 
singular causal counterfactuals. Where causes act with stable tendencies we can be 
in a powerful situation with respect to either full or partial models because in this case 
the causes contribute by a systematic rule that we can learn about and encode in our 
theories. Otherwise prediction is more piecemeal and local and though we often do it 
well, there is little good philosophical work on how to do so. So where tendencies can 
be relied on,21 these will be a huge help in constructing a causal model for the 
evaluation of a specific causal counterfactual. Even if not all the causes present have 
a stable tendency so there are unsystematic interferences, if the targeted one has a 
known contribution then it may at least be possible to calculate an effect direction or 
even an effect difference. And certainly tendency claims are the central way by which 
it-works-somewhere claims can come to count as evidence that it will work for us. 
 
Where we know of no stable tendencies then we are more at sea. I take it that we are 
often good at local detailed causal reasoning but that we need a great deal more 
concerted research on what strategies are reasonable to pursue in these areas. 
What matters, I believe, is to recognize the epistemic and ontological situation we are 
in when we want to judge if a treatment will work for us and do the best we can, 
hedging our bets and recognizing when we are making heroic assumptions in 
constructing our causal model and when not. 
Given the limitations of tendency logic it is important to recognize that Pearl’s 
semantics, and others like it, presuppose tendencies.22 Pearl’s causal models consist 
of a set of causal claims in functional form, one for each effect under study, with a 
dependent variable as effect and the independent variables as causes, plus a 
probability measure over the exogenous variables (i.e. those variables representing 
quantities not caused by other quantities represented in the set under study). To 
evaluate the counterfactual ‘T would produce O for us’23 Pearl substitutes for the law 
in the model for t (t = f(x,y,z,…)), t = T, leaving all other laws in the model the same. 
This represents setting the value of t ‘surgically’, as should be done in a method-of-
difference study. The assumption that this is always possible for any cause in the 
model is called modularity. The value of O that results is ultimately calculated from 
the law in the model for O, a law of the form O = g(r,s,t,…).  
What we should note is that the general assumption that a system of laws is modular 
presupposes that the causes in that model have stable tendencies, stable at least 
across all the uses to which the model and its accompanying semantics is put.  The 
contribution of a cause to an effect is given by the term in which that cause appears 
in the law for the effect; the rule of combination, by the functional form. Consider for 
instance the law, acc = GM/r2 + εq1q2/r2, for the acceleration of a particle of charge q2 
in the vicinity of the earth (of mass M) and of another particle of charge of q1. The 
mass of the earth makes a stable contribution of the size of its mass (M) multiplied by 
the acceleration of gravity G and the inverse of the square of the distance of its 
                                                 
21
 But be careful. Many tendencies are conditional: They hold relative to an underlying structure that 
gives rise to them. So in using them we are betting on the stability of the underlying structure – in my 
language,  a ‘nomologival machine’; and, as always, it is best to have as much evidence as possible to 
decide which way and how much to bet. (For a longer discussion see Cartwright (forthcoming) and 
(1989).)  
22
 Although James Woodward (2004) does not offer a detailed semantics for counterfactuals, he is 
another causal theorist who makes very strong modularity assumptions, hence very strong tendency 
assumptions. 
23
 Here I suppose that T and O are specific values that some random variable, t, o, can take.  
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centre of mass from the particle. This adds vectorially with the contribution that the 
charge q1 makes, which is its size multiplied by εq2/r2. Ask now ‘Would setting q1 = Q1 
increase the particle’s acceleration?’ To answer, following Pearl, calculate acc = 
GM/r2 + εQ1q2/r2, substituting for the other values in this equation the values they 
take in the situation at hand. The assumption that the mass of the earth continues to 
contribute in exactly the same way as the value of the charge is changed is to 
suppose that the mass has a stable tendency. Similarly, to assume that the functional 
form for the electrostatic term stays the same, and indeed the overall functional form 
for acceleration does too, is to assume that charge has a stable tendency.24 So to 
assume modularity for changes under every variable in the model is to make very 
strong tendency assumptions.25 
I obviously have no quarrel with tendencies, having defended them for well over two 
decades. But we need to keep clearly in mind the lesson of section 3.2.2.  Causes 
often act holistically; tendencies cannot be taken to be the rule. Mill himself felt that 
the logic of tendencies applied in physics and in political economy but not in 
chemistry or more generally in the study of society26 and Julian Reiss argues that 
they are not all that common even in political economy.27 Nor are the conventional 
methods by which we test causal claims sufficient to establish tendency claims, 
especially not the wide-ranging claims about tendencies presupposed in taking a 
causal model to be modular. And I should stress that this is true not only for the 
method-of-difference methods discussed in this paper but for a wide variety of other 
valid methods for causal inference as well, including various econometric methods 
and many that trace causal pathways. 
Aside on representation. This brings me to a point about representation that is 
somewhat more complex than the issues I have discussed so far, but one that 
matters to the question of how causal models help in the evaluation of it-will-work-for-
us claims. Pearl, faced with challenges like mine to strong modularity assumptions, 
maintains that when the model is not modular that just means it is misspecified; that 
is, we haven’t written down the right model. Whether he is right or not depends on 
how one conceives of his causal models. One way is to start with an independent 
notion of ‘causal law’, one that meshes at least reasonably well with our accepted 
methods for testing/establishing causal laws. Then one can consider how this model 
can be used (if at all!) to evaluate singular causal counterfactuals. If we read Pearl 
this way then it looks as if he offers a semantics that should allow us to evaluate any 
                                                 
24
 This can be a misleading example because these tendencies are, or are often supposed to be basic, 
hence universal. As mentioned in footnote 21, most tendencies, however, depend instead on some 
stable underlying structure to give rise to and maintain them. So they are stable across changes that 
affect only arrangements in the superstructure, not necessarily across those that affect the substructure. 
25
 Again, there is a serious caution to be urged. I said that Pearl’s equations were of a familiar kind that 
we have rules for how to estimate and sufficient conditions (as with instrumental variable models or 
others I describe in Cartwright (2007)) for determining if they can be interpreted causally. But neither 
these standard methods nor the sufficient conditions I know about warrant the modularity assumptions 
necessary to use the equations as instructed to draw counterfactual conclusions. This remark is 
essentially a repeat of my two-fold point that the equations, given their prescribed use in warranting 
counterfactual predictions, presuppose tendencies and that tendencies need a good deal more evidence 
to be warranted than that provided by the standard methods that warrant it-works-somewhere 
conclusions. 
26
 Mill (1836). This would have placed Mill in the later methodenstreit (the battle of methods) more on 
the side of Schmoller and the holists, as opposed to Menger and those who believed in the wide 
applicability throughout the social sciences of the analytic method.  
27
 Reiss (2007) 
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counterfactual with any variable28 from the model in the antecedent and any variable 
from the model in the consequent.  
This I believe is what Pearl is generally taken to be doing; and as a strategy it has 
exactly the problems I have described here. First, we do not have sufficient reason to 
take tendencies to be the rule, or even the fallback position. The causal laws 
governing situations are often holistic so that they are not much of a guide about 
what happens when the whole causal complex is no longer the same. Second is the 
point I have mentioned but not developed in any detail here,29 that causal laws 
generally depend on some underlying structure that gives rise to and maintains them 
and many of the ways we implement antecedents in counterfactuals can undermine 
this structure in ways that destroy the very causal laws we hope to use to evaluate 
the counterfactual. 
A usual fix for these problems is to try to extend the variables in the model. In this 
case the new variables would have to include descriptions of the possible underlying 
structures that could arise from any method of implementing a change on any 
variable in the model plus all new variables implicated in causal relations that the 
various new substructures would give rise to. Of course this is no fix for the problem 
of holism. As a fix for the problem that causal laws as we usually think of them and 
test for them depend on vulnerable substructures to support them, it seems 
impossible. Moreover, it is a cheat. We cannot define a proper variable whose values 
are the unending open-ended array of possible substructures that could exist once 
we start to intervene;30 and if we could, it certainly would not be a random variable of 
the kind required in Pearl’s models: Neither nature nor we supply a probability 
measure over any such array of possibilities.  
The second way to interpret the causal laws in a model is to backread the ‘causal 
laws’ for a situation from the proffered semantics and the set of counterfactuals true 
for a given set of features in that situation. That is, the causal laws are whatever they 
have to be to allow the semantics to give correct results for the counterfactuals. This 
interpretation fits more closely with the claim that if the models aren’t modular then 
they are misspecified. Probably it is easy to show that a model of Pearl form can be 
created that gives the correct results for any targeted counterfactual. But there is no 
guarantee that such a model can be created for an arbitrary collection of true 
counterfactuals over features under consideration, let alone a full set of them. 
My own version of a causal model falls between these two. It is a model purpose built 
for evaluating a particular counterfactual as it would be implemented. Write down the 
causes of the targeted effect that will be in place given the implementation and 
consider what together they produce. The strength of this proposal is that it is sure to 
produce correct answers if we can carry it off. This is just the flip side of its chief 
weakness: We do not have set procedures for doing this and often are at sea.  
                                                 
28
 Actually the semantics is stronger than that for it allows a mix of variables in the antecedent. 
29
 For more on this point see my various discussions of nomological machines (to be found in the two 
references from footnote 21 plus further references in those). 
30
 John Worrall, in referee’s comments, suggests that many people think that the array of structures that 
could exist is not open-ended. I suppose they take a view of the world reflected in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus: crudely, there are a fixed number of features in the world and the possible facts are exactly 
all the combinations of all the possible values of all the possible features. If I had to indulge in 
metaphysics, this is not one I would go for. But even if it were true, this does little in aid of establishing 
that there are random variables to represent this vast array since that requires reason to believe that 
there is a proper probability measures over it. And where does that come from? 
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One may wish for more. Indeed a referee for this paper expresses just this: ‘We are 
told that we need to model the causal situation with tendencies but there is little detail 
on what such models would look like.’ I am happy that sometimes such models will 
look like Pearl models, and that we could then use Pearl’s semantics to generate 
counterfactuals with them. What I do not accept is that we can give much advice 
about how to build the model. I have spent a lot of time studying very successful 
models in physics – like models for lasers or for the gyroscopes that reveal 
precession due to space-time coupling in the Stanford Gravity-probe experiment, and 
also studying promising models in economics that are less predictively successful but 
are not disasters. The most I can say is that the modelling enterprise and importantly 
the enterprise of figuring out how good these models are ex ante – before they are 
used for prediction – seems to have no fixed rules and little good substance-neutral 
advice. But that I think is not only a fundamental fact about evidence; it is the human 
condition, better to be acknowledged and managed than denied or ignored. 
3. Conclusion 
My focus here has been on Mill’s method-of-difference studies and what they can 
teach us about whether proposed interventions will have targeted effects when 
implemented as they would in fact be implemented (i.e. ‘it-will-work-for-us claims). 
These methods, I have argued, can establish claims of the form ‘It works 
somewhere.’ But it’s a long road from ‘It works somewhere’ to ‘It will work for us’. 
The central problem I raise is that we do not have very good methodological guides 
for how to traverse this road. I argue that ‘external validity’ is generally a dead end: it 
seldom obtains and, because it depends so delicately on things being the same in 
just the right ways, it is even rarer that we can have reasonable warrant that it 
obtains. Instead tendency claims are the chief conduits by which ‘it-works-
somewhere’ claims come to be evidence that a proposed intervention will work for 
us. This narrows the problem but does not solve it. For we do not have good explicit 
methodologies for how to establish tendency claims. Nor do we have explicit 
methodologies for how to use them to build case-specific models for evaluating 
whether the proposed intervention will work. And if I am right about how predicatively 
successful models are usually built even in physics, we haven’t much reason to think 
any such methodology will be forthcoming.  
What then is the role of the highly vaunted Mill’s method-of-difference studies, 
including the current favourite, the RCT, in providing evidence that T will work for us 
to promote O? The ideal RCT can show that T works somewhere; a real RCT is one 
fallible indicator in what is hopefully a far fuller evidence base that T works 
somewhere. That T works somewhere can be a part, albeit a small part, of an 
evidence base to support T’s capacity to contribute to O. That T has a capacity to 
promote O can serve as part, again probably only a small part, of the evidence that 
supports the case-specific causal model that is the eventual base for our predictions 
about whether T will work for us. So it is indeed a long road and most often an 
insecure one. But it is better to understand and acknowledge that than to presuppose 
heroic assumptions without admission, without examination, without evidence and 
without all the hedging that responsible betting calls for. 
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